Public Bill Committee

[Frank Cook in the Chair]

Clause 14

Material subject to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Amendment proposed (this day): 26, in clause 14, page 30, leave out lines 26 to 34 and insert
(3) Subject to subsection (3AA) to (3AI), the material must be destroyed as soon as it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken or supplied.
(3AA) Where any fingerprint, impression of footwear or DNA profile has been taken from a person under this Part who is arrested for or charged with a sexual offence or violent offence, the fingerprint, impression of footwear or DNA profile shall be destroyed no later than
(a) in the case of fingerprints or impressions of footwear, before the end of the period of three years beginning with the date on which the fingerprints or impression were taken, such date being the initial retention date; or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, before the end of the period of three years beginning with the date on which the DNA sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken (or if the profile was derived from more than one DNA sample, the date on which the first of those samples was taken), such date being the initial DNA retention date; or
(c) such later date as may be ordered under subsection (3AB).
(3AB) On application made by the responsible chief officer of police within the period of three months before the initial retention date or the initial DNA retention date as the case may be, the Crown Court, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so, may make an order amending, or further amending, the date of destruction of the relevant fingerprint, impression of footwear or DNA profile.
(3AC) An order under subsection (3AB) shall not specify a date more than two years later than
(a) the initial retention date in relation to fingerprints or impressions of footwear, or
(b) the initial DNA retention date in the case of a DNA profile.
(3AD) Any decision of the Crown Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal within 21 days of such decision.
(3AE) Subsection (3AA) does not apply where
(a) an application under subsection (3AB) above has been made but has not been determined;
(b) the period within which an appeal may be brought under subsection (3AD) above against a decision to refuse an application has not elapsed; or
(c) such an appeal has been brought but has not been withdrawn or finally determined.
(3AF) Where
(a) the period within which an appeal referred to in subsection (3AD) has elapsed without such an appeal being brought; or
(b) such an appeal is brought and is withdrawn or finally determined without any extension of the time period referred to in subsection (3AC);
the fingerprint, impression of footwear or DNA profile shall be destroyed as soon as possible thereafter.
(3AG) For the purposes of this section a sexual offence or violent offence shall mean such offences of a violent or sexual nature as shall be set out in any order made by the Secretary of State with reference to this section.
(3AH) An order under this section must be made by statutory instrument.
(3AI) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (3AH) above shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament..(James Brokenshire.)

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Frank Cook: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: amendment 69, in clause 14, page 30, line 27, after footwear, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of the period of one year beginning from the date of that acquittal and otherwise.
Amendment 70, in clause 14, page 30, line 28, leave out 6 and insert 3.
Amendment 71, in clause 14, page 30, line 30, after profile, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of the period of one year beginning from the date of that acquittal and otherwise.
Amendment 72, in clause 14, page 30, line 30, leave out 6 and insert 3.
Amendment 27, in clause 14, page 30, leave out lines 35 to 38.
Amendment 82, in clause 14, page 31, line 10, after footwear, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of one year beginning from the date of that trial or otherwise.
Amendment 83, in clause 14, page 31, line 13, after profile, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of one year beginning from the date of that trial or otherwise.
Amendment 86, in clause 14, page 32, line 21, after footwear, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of one year beginning from the date of that acquittal or otherwise.
Amendment 87, in clause 14, page 32, line 24, after profile, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of one year beginning from the date of that acquittal or otherwise.
Amendment 76, in clause 14, page 33, line 33, after footwear, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of the period of one year beginning from the date of that trial or otherwise.
Amendment 77, in clause 14, page 33, line 34, leave out 6 and insert 3.
Amendment 78, in clause 14, page 33, line 36, after profile, insert
and if acquitted after a trial before the end of one year beginning from the date of the trial or otherwise.
Amendment 79, in clause 14, page 33, line 36, leave out 6 and insert 3.
Amendment 73, in clause 14, page 34, line 41, leave out 5 and insert 2.
New clause 6Destruction of fingerprints and samples
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 64A insert
64B Destruction of fingerprints and samples etc.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), where a sample has been taken from a person under this Part, unless such a person has given consent in accordance with section 64(3AC), all such samples and all information derived from such samples shall be destroyed as soon as possible following a decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the person or on the conclusion of such proceedings otherwise than with a conviction.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall not apply where the record, sample or information in question is of the same kind as a record, a sample or, as the case may be, information lawfully held in relation to the person.
(3) For the purposes of this section, criminal proceedings shall not be deemed to have concluded until the earlier of
(a) the lapse of any applicable appeal period, and
(b) a decision not to appeal such proceedings.
(4) Material falls within this subsection if it is
(a) fingerprints or impressions of footwear taken from the person in connection with the investigation of the offence;
(b) a DNA profile derived from a DNA sample so taken;
(c) photographs falling within a description specified in the regulations; or
(d) information derived from DNA samples so taken from a person.
(5) For the purposes of this section
(a) photograph includes a moving image, and
(b) the reference to a DNA sample is a reference to any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells..
New clause 7Retention of voluntary samples
(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 64(1A)(b) insert
(c) any other provision in this Part does not prohibit or restrict their retention or require their destruction..
(3) For section 64(3AC) substitute
3AC Retention of voluntary samples etc.
Where a person from whom a fingerprint, impression of footwear or sample has been taken consents in writing to its retention
(a) that sample need not be destroyed under subsection (3) above;
(b) subsection (3AB) above shall not restrict the use that may be made of the sample or of any information derived from it; and
(c) that consent shall be treated as comprising a consent for the purposes of section 63A(1C) above; provided that
(i) no sample or information derived from any sample may be retained on any child under the age of 10 years; and
(ii) consent given for the purposes of this subsection shall be capable of being withdrawn by such person upon making written application to the responsible chief officer of police or person authorised by the Secretary of State for such purpose whereupon such sample and any information derived therefrom shall be destroyed as soon as possible following receipt of such written application..
New clause 8Repeal of section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
Section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is repealed..
We resume after what I hope was an adequate lunch for all right hon. and hon. Members. Mr. Brokenshire, you were answering the debate, so may I ask you to resume your soliloquy, please?

James Brokenshire: I shall leave it to the rest of the Committee to judge whether it is a soliloquy or not.

Frank Cook: Are you challenging the Chairman?

James Brokenshire: I would never dream of challenging the Chairman, so I shall continue my comments or soliloquy, as the Chairman wishes.
When we broke for lunch, I was responding to the debate on this group of amendments. The Minister of State had set out the Governments position, and I was making it clear that I accept neither his characterisation of the official Opposition as not accepting the use of technology and DNA, nor his suggestion that our proposals, including amendment 26, reflected that.
Now that we have had our lunch break, is the right hon. Gentleman able to respond to a point that I raised in relation to the case studies that he cited in the letter that was handed to the Committee? He did not seem to disagree with my comment that case study 5 and case study 1 might be one and the same case. That is quite important because obviously the letter has been put before the Committee. The facts in case study 5 are quite limited, and I made my assumption based on the limited facts. I do not know whether the Minister has sought clarification over the lunch break. Perhaps he can respond on that point.

David Hanson: I am happy, if it is helpful, to respond further on a number of points that the hon. Gentleman made in the morning sitting. I was trying to be helpful to the Committee by completing my remarks in time for a possible Division at 10.25, but as we instead proceeded, I should be happy to continue the debate shortly.

James Brokenshire: I hear what the Minister says, but the letter has been put before the Committee.

David Hanson: I will happily cover that point now, in an intervention. Having checked the matter, I can say that case study 1 and case study 5 are the same case. One reason why there is some difficulty is that we have been seeking to ensure that we get victim approval when victims names are put into the public domain. Every name that I have mentioned in my contributions has had the victims approval of it being put into the public domain. There was some confusion over those cases. I will clarify the matter if necessary by letter for the Committee, but we have many more cases that we have permission to use, and I will do so during the debate.

James Brokenshire: I am a little disturbed by what the Minister has said. Obviously, we have received the letter, which in effect set out to formalise the Governments approach and to show why the Government feel that the Scottish model, and any adjustments in that direction, are not appropriate. It is therefore quite worrying if we are being told that there are five case studies when in fact there are four. I ask the Minister to reflect on whether a letter of clarification should be written to the Chairmen, in case the documents are all put down as evidence to the Committee and then all bound up and looked at afterwards. The question is what other facts may not be correct if, just having highlighted one issue

Frank Cook: Order. I might be able to help. The letter was sent to Members. It becomes evidence only if it is sent to the Committee as evidenceif it is stated that it is sent as evidence. If that helps to clarify the matter and deal with the hon. Gentlemans concern, we might be able to move forward.

James Brokenshire: I am grateful for that, Mr. Cook. It was the fact that the letter had been addressed to you and your co-Chairman that gave me the impression of extended formality. I think the Minister was indicating that he wished to intervene, but if he does not, I will leave that point, because I understand what he is saying. I do not want to delay the Committee and I know that the right hon. Gentleman will respond as required on the matter. We look forward to receiving that information in due course.
We have heard clearly that on the balance of proportionality, there is a difference of opinion in the Committee. In the light of that, I wish to test the Committees opinion on amendment 26.

Tom Brake: On a point of order, Mr. Cook. I wish to ensure that the record is clear. Before we broke for lunch, the Minister of State referred to a case involving a constituent of mine. He may have led the Committee into believing that, if adopted, Liberal Democrat party policy would have made a difference and not allowed the murderer in that case to have been pursued.
For the sake of clarity, I must point out that my partys policy would have made no difference, because the assailant in that case was arrested some months afterwards and his DNA was captured then. That sample was cross-referenced with the DNA captured at the crime scene. I wish the record to be clear that that case would have been pursued to a successful conclusion.

David Hanson: Further to that point of order, Mr. Cook. I am happy for the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington to give us whatever clarification he wishes in relation to specific cases, including the one I mentioned. The facts that I put to the Committee this morning are the same: Liberal Democrat policy, principled though it is, would lead to fewer convictions because of the lack of use of DNA.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 7.

Question accordingly negatived.

James Brokenshire: On a point of order, Mr. Cook. This may be an appropriate point to raise the matter. I understand from the business statement made earlier today on the Floor of the House that there will be a motion to approve an instruction relating to the Crime and Security Bill next Wednesday. I wonder whether you have received notification of it or had any instruction relating to the matter. Motions seem regularly to appear at the moment, and any clarification would be greatly appreciated.

Frank Cook: I grasp the point. I have not been informed, but it is not a matter for the Committee. It is a matter for the Chamber and the business of the House.

David Hanson: Further to that point of order, Mr. Cook. I will write to members of the Committee and to you and Sir Nicholas about those matters, but I had to wait for an announcement to be made by the Leader of the House on the Floor of the House before I could do so.

Frank Cook: Thank you very much. We are all being very proper today, thankfully.

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment 150, in clause 14, page 30, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 35.
We come to a slightly narrower point and a further testing amendment on the differential approach being applied in relation to young people and adults. During the first debate on clause 14, I acknowledged that the Government sought to adopt a different regime for children to reflect not only the Marper judgment but the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. However, under the proposals on retention periods for adults and persons under 18, will the DNA of a young person convicted of an offence, albeit not a qualifying offence falling within a category designated by the Government as serious, not be retained for longer than someone who is innocent in the eyes of the law?
The retention period for an adult arrested for any offence will be six years, whereas the period for a young person convicted of an offence other than a qualifying offence will be five years. In essence, someone who is guilty of an offence will be treated more leniently than someone who is not guilty. Will the Minister explain the thinking behind the relative positions? We touched on this question during our previous debate, albeit obliquely, but it is worth probing the Governments thinking to explore how they have arrived at those retention periods.
The Minister of State has discussed dealing with minor as well as more serious offending, yet the Government have made a distinction on that point in respect of children which cuts across some of the more general arguments made in the previous debate and seems inconsistent with their broad view on retaining DNA records. It would be useful to understand the difference in thinking on this issue. Why has a distinction been made that appears to treat young people who have offended more leniently than those who have not offended at all?

David Hanson: This is an interesting amendment, and the hon. Gentleman has phrased it so as to allow debate on convictions involving under-18s. The reason for the differential is that we have taken a view that young people are often involved in minor crime at a young age, but we hope that diversionary activity through youth offending teams, youth custody if necessary, non-court disposals and a range of activities will help to ensure that when the individual reaches the age of maturity at 18, they will not progress into the criminal justice system for a long period.
We have considered the matter in factual terms. We recognise that for many teenagers, criminal activity can be and often is a minor and isolated incident. However, teenage involvement in crime can be a strong indicator of risk of further criminality in adulthood, so we need to consider retaining DNA up to the age of 18. Based on a fair assessment of the difficulties faced by young people, we will call an end to retention at the age of 18 to give young people a fresh start in life.
As the hon. Gentleman will know, we have again downgraded the proposals from our May 2009 consultation. We have changed our original proposals for first convictions under 18that records be removed at 18 or retained indefinitelyto retention for five years. Individuals could, for example, be convicted of an offence at the age of criminal responsibility of 10 or 11, and in such instances, a five-year period would be sufficient to ensure that they can examine their criminality. If they commit further crimes, retention will continue. Changes have been made in the regulations after our May 2009 consultation and I believe that they are fair and just.
The hon. Gentleman is right to raise the question whether we will have people who have not been convicted of a crime having their DNA retained for a longer periodsix yearsthan those who have been convicted of a crime under the age of 18. Again, it boils down to the judgments that we have made in the context of European legislation. I still think that the six-year period is fair, based on the evidence that we talked about under the previous group of amendments and our discussions about the clause generally. I also think that the five-year figure is fair for under-18s. It is a matter of judgment and that is the judgment that we have come to, which is based on the offending rates of younger people and on the likelihood of offending for those who are not convicted but who are initially charged.

James Brokenshire: The Minister of State said that he has undertaken some analysis and research in relation to youth offending rates. That does not appear to be captured in the hazard rate analysis, which is more general in plotting the hazard rate curve. That may have been because of the relevant information that was available to him. However, is there any published research or anything else that led him to conclude that the five-year period is appropriate, or was it, as he says, simply a matter of judgment?

David Hanson: We have a range of information, which we continuously examine, about youth offending rates between the ages of 10 and 18. There are peak years when offending commencesaround the ages of 14 and 15which are covered in the maximum retention period of five years up to the age of 18. At that point, we are trying to draw a line in the sand to give people a new opportunity not to offend again in their adult years after an offending period in their teenage years. The age of criminal responsibility is and will remain the age of 10. People can be convicted of criminal offences from that age. The majority of our young offenders are between 13 and 18. That is why we made the judgment that we did in relation to the five-year period.
I do not have statistics to hand, although I may get some during the debate. However, I know from my experience of having responsibility for the Youth Justice Board and for youth justice in two years as a Justice Minister our focus all along was on diverting people away from the criminal justice system, changing their behaviour and ensuring that we gave them a new start in life at 18. We did not succeed in every instance, but that is the principle and the logic behind the proposals that are before the Committee.

James Brokenshire: I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says and I respect the approach of trying to give young people who may have committed one minor offence an opportunity to reflect on that offence and not necessarily have it blight the rest of their life by affecting their employment and life chances. I understand and recognise the principle that he is seeking to establish. The issue is more fundamental. It requires that we take a step back from that approach, use our judgment and examine the time periods for records and DNA profiles are to be kept. We seem to have ended up in a rather perverse situation, where a young person who has not been convicted is being treated less leniently than someone who has been convicted. It is almost like treating someone who is innocent more harshly than someone who is guilty. It is important that we recognise that logical inconsistency.
I will certainly reflect on what the Minister of State has said and I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. However, my parting comment is that, at the very least, the situation seems rather odd. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 130, in clause 14, page 35, line 29, leave out sections 64ZB and insert section 64ZB, or sections 64ZD.(Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment is consequential on amendments 128 and 129.

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment 151, in clause 14, page 36, leave out lines 21 to 41.
The amendment relates to new section 64ZK of PACE, inserted by the Bill, which gives a chief officer of police the power to retain DNA profiles for rolling two-year periods if that officer judges it necessary to do so
for the purposes of national security.
I am sorry if I sound slightly cynical about the term national security, but it seems from some of our debates that there is very wide scope to use other powers and justify it on the basis of national security. The provision therefore flags up concerns about what we mean by national security.
Earlier in our proceedings, we heard of the concerns that Lord Carlile expressed in his last report about powers that were ostensibly intended for the purposes of national security being used for non-national security purposes. Given what he has said, and given our previous experience of this Government, there are grounds for questioning whether the wording will be used in a way that reflects our interpretation of itin relation to anti-terrorism and other such mattersor whether the perspective will be much broader.
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 springs to mind in the context of powers whose use has been justified on the grounds of national security. A raft of organisations have been approved to use the powers under the Act, which have been applied to minor infractions, such as dog fouling. The former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith), even referred to its being used by the dustbin Stasi.

Tony Baldry: Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government are starting way back on their own five-yard line as far as the Opposition are concerned? My hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green) was arrested on the grounds of so-called national security, and it will take Opposition Members some time to forgive the Government for that.

James Brokenshire: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. He underlines again why there is rightly scepticism and concern about the inclusion of terms such as national security, given the way in which they may be interpreted. He obviously highlights

Frank Cook: Order. I fear that I must ask members of the Committee to remember my comments on Tuesday about making statements through the Chair, which means to the Chair. Everyone can hear what is being said if comments are addressed to the Chair.

James Brokenshire: Thank you, Mr. Cook. When an intervention has been made, I will try to prevent myself from turning round and not respecting your position as Chair of the Committee. Nothing was intended by that.

Frank Cook: It is the Chairs position, not mine.

James Brokenshire: I respect the Chairs position and you in your capacity as Chair, Mr. Cook.

David Hanson: And so do I, for the avoidance of doubt.

James Brokenshire: Concern has been raised about the reference to national security. The provisions of new section 64ZK appear to allow for the indefinite retention of the DNA profile of someone who is innocent of any crime; indeed, they may not even be a suspect. It appears from the language in the Bill that the rolling two-year period can be extended for another two years and then for another two years. It is therefore a concern that there is no oversight and that everything is down to the judgment of the relevant chief officer of police. As I indicated, the wording is not framed in a way that suggests that the power should be used, for example, to prevent acts of terrorism.
My first question to the Minister is why the power has been drawn so widely and in such an open-ended way. A chief officer of police seems to have wide discretion. Is there nothing in the powers interpretationI appreciate that this is pushing the language to its nth degreeto prevent a chief officer of police from determining that all DNA under his or her control should be retained to aid the purposes of national security? The language is framed in such an open-ended way that it almost allows that sort of determination. What rights would an individual have in relation to the notification of such a determination by a chief officer of police?
The Bill has various requirements to notify someone about the destruction of their profile or the DNA information or sample that they have provided, so will the lack of such a notification inform someone that their DNA is being retained for the extended period? Is there some other mechanism that will allow someone to know that that is the case?
Linked to that is the question whether the chief officer of police would be expected to provide grounds for such a determination. If asked why someones DNA has been retained under new section 64ZK, does the chief officer of police have the justification or ability to offer an explanation, or will their response simply be, In my judgment, this is required for the purposes of national security.? As there is no oversight, what right of challenge would someone have? Is it anticipated that there will be any right of appeal against such a determination? Would we then simply return to the current guidance issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers and say that it is only in exceptional circumstances that we would remove the DNA profile?
The language used does not appear to reflect the Home Secretarys statement last November when the proposals on DNA retention were being outlined. On the retention of DNA in relation to terrorism and national security, the Home Secretary said:
Material taken under any regime (including the Terrorism Act 2000) would be able to be retained beyond the six-year point where there is a case for doing so on the basis of a case-by-case review on national security grounds. This would require a review by a senior police officer every two yearsalthough data would be deleted if it became clear between reviews that its retention would no longer be necessary.[Official Report, 11 November 2009; Vol. 499, c. 28WS.]
That last part does not seem to be reflected in the Bill, which outlines a two-year determination. Moreover, it does not state that the determination will remain in effect only when there are concerns about national security and that it would be automatically released when those concerns were no longer evident.
The issue is notification and knowing why a chief officer of police may have taken such a judgment. In some cases, there may be justifiable reasons for not notifying, because it could put lives at risk. I respect that, but it is a question of how that then fits in with how someone can challenge. We are almost getting into the grounds of a control order-type regime, where people are not necessarily aware of what they may be challenged with, there is no evidence and they do not believe that they have done anything wrong. Moreover, there are questions about misjudgement and whether the facts that have been presented are correct. It would be helpful to understand why the concept of deletion between reviews if the concerns regarding national security are no longer evident is not reflected in new section 64ZK. That would at least offer clarification and bring the new section in line with the Home Secretarys stated intentions in his initial announcement.
I return to the distinction with which I began on the broad application of national security. The phrase can be interpreted widely. What is in the national interest? What does national security mean? It extends beyond what might be perceived to be prevention of terrorism. I say that not because of idle speculation, but because on page 37 of the Bill, new section 64ZN on the use of retained material draws a distinction. It sets out two categories of reasons to retain DNA: in the interests of national security and for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. That makes me query the intention behind the use of the words national security. If a distinction is being drawn in a separate clause to suggest that the meaning goes wider than terrorist-type activity, a court would say that national security is a much broader category.
The Government must clarify whether they have terrorism-related activities in mind, or whether the provision is broader and, if it is, what sort of circumstances they are trying to cover. They must provide that clarification because of the concern and sensitivity about how the Government, whatever their colourI am not suggesting that the current Government would seek to use the provision as I have outlinedmight use it. Parliament must legislate in language that is not open to abuse by any future Government. Once a statute is on the statute book, it stays there unless it is changed or repealed. Clarification of the language is important because of the issues that I have highlighted, and to ensure that there is no future misunderstanding about the scope and intent of the provision.

Tom Brake: I congratulate the hon. Member for Hornchurch on bringing this matter to the Committees attention. He has raised some serious points, which I echo, particularly about previous pieces of legislation, such as RIPA and section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which have experienced mission creep and been used for purposes that were never intended when the legislation was drafted and debated. The provision before us may fall into that category. Soon, we will discuss gang injunctions, about which I have the same concernthat mission creep may arise. The hon. Gentleman has raised some serious questions, which I hope the Minister will answer.
When the national security issue was raised during our fourth sitting, I asked the Minister in what circumstances national security exemptions apply, and he said that
a police officer may wish to apply to extend that six-year period for a further year
we are discussing a maximum of two years
subject to judicial oversight.
He continued:
The police would make a case to extend that retention period, under strict regulation, beyond the six-year period for those reasons.[Official Report, Crime and Security Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2010; c. 133, Q93.]
Those reasons are national security.
I hope that the Minister will give us some more detailed information about how he expects that judicial review process to work, and the grounds, based on national security, on which a police officer may apply for retention. As the hon. Member for Hornchurch said, we are not expecting the Minister to reveal secrets that could threaten our national security, but we hope that he will give a further explanation of the grounds, the justification that might have to be deployed by police officers, and the appeal process that may be available to individualsif, indeed, they are aware that their data are being retained, not deleted.
Finally, this is exactly the sort of issue that will lead to the Minister having to give me that fiver that he proffered earlier. Having worked in IT before I was elected to the House, I know that that is exactly the sort of area where things tend to go wrong. It involves exceptions, and that is where problems will arise in relation to the fantastic algorithm that will automatically delete everyone from the database at the appropriate time. I suspect that it would be simpler for the Minister to give me that fiver now. I promise to give it back to him if he can prove to me, in future years, that no one has fallen foul of his algorithm.

David Hanson: On the day that Sir Thomas Legg has produced his report, I do not think that it is appropriate for me to give fivers to anybody, given recent circumstances.
Both hon. Gentlemen have raised real issues that need explanation and examination. Let us be clear about the impact of the amendment. It would remove all powers for the police to retain, for a period of two years, DNA profiles under national security considerations. It is fair that the Committee asks what exactly is meant by the provision. There is no clear, standard, legislative definition of national security. I want to place on record what we understand that definition to be, because that will help those who will interpret the legislation downstream, should it be passed by both Houses of Parliament.
We are clear that the legislation will define national security in the terms that I will put before the Committee today. It will cover counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and counter-proliferation. Those functions are currently covered by the security services and will be well known and well understood by the Committee. Again, a judgment has to be made. We believe that there are circumstances where the ongoing nature of terrorist activities, and the ongoing need to monitor them, requires the potential retention of DNA beyond the six-year period, for a rolling period of two years. That will be authorised by a senior officer, and the period will be subject to that end date and to further renewal if the individual is still of interest to the security services.

Tom Brake: Does the Minister of State expect that police officers will automatically seek a two-year extension, or does he expect some variation, with officers requesting a six-month, 12-month or 18-month extension, as the legislation appears to allow?

David Hanson: The six-year period is the six-year period. If the security services and the police, at chief constable and senior officer level, have an interest in an individual and wish to apply for retention, that could be for one year, or any period up to a maximum of two years, by which time a further application would need to be made. That is done for a very simple purpose. Let me quote Sir Hugh Orde from the second sitting of the evidence sessions:
In my previous world, in Northern Ireland, some very dangerous people were entirely innocent in lawas in, they were never convictedbut I was greatly reassured that I had a better position in terms of keeping the public safe by knowing I had some information, which, if crimes were committed by those individuals, I could use to deliver an effective investigation.[Official Report, Crime and Security Public Bill Committee, 26 January 2010; c. 40, Q72.]
I know from my two years as a Minister in Northern Ireland that there were many people whose DNA it would have been valuable to have retained for ongoing investigations, and sometimes for historical, cold case reviews. There are many cold case reviews ongoing in Northern Ireland, relating to unsolved crimes from the very difficult troubles of the 70s and 80s. There have been convictions now. The Enniskillen bombing was the subject of a court case some years ago. In the end, that did not lead to a particular conviction, but it had to do with a review of a cold case from 1998 and DNA was involved in the discussions.
The chief officer might well wish to retain the DNA of someone who was convicted in Northern Ireland of fuel laundering, post-office robbery or bank robbery, but who, ultimately, might also be associated with a murder, such as that horrific event in Enniskillen in 1987. The theory is that in such cases a chief officer could request continued retention, because there would be an ongoing interest in coming to conclusions. The retention is renewable; the material is not held in perpetuity, because the retention has to be renewed under that authority, but there are concerns about how that would work in practice.
There is no appeal formally, because often the individual would not know about the retention. They sometimes would not know that the police were interested in them for counter-terrorism, security or other reasons. I saw lots of very difficult things in my two years in Northern Ireland. I can think of numerous examples where information came through on individuals who were apparently involved in no crime or in low-level crime, but we knew through Security Service information that they were engaged in plotting, planning and trying to execute other offences. Reflecting on the retention, I can see that it could be seen as a curtailment of civil liberties, but one that is undertaken for the greater good of the public at large.
Before I take interventions, I would like to cover one further point. We want judicial oversight, as I said in my evidence. The Home Secretary has said that he is considering whether there should be provision for an independent reviewer of the legislation, in relation to the national security provisions, but that is not in the Bill, and we have made no final decisions. We are seeking oversight. Lord Carlile is undertaking oversight of the application of section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and we are considering a similar process for the retention of DNA. We have not taken a decision yet, but when we do, we will inform the Committee.

Tom Brake: The Minister of State may not be able to answer, or perhaps should not answer, this question, but if someone were to make a speculative approach because they suspected that their DNA was retained, how would that be handled?

David Hanson: That takes us into difficult territories, for the simple reason that for counter-terrorism activity to work, the people being scrutinised by the counter-terrorism authorities in relation to potential or actual criminal acts cannot know about that scrutiny. In my role as Minister for Policing, Crime and Counter-Terrorism, on numerous occasions I learn of activities that the individuals whom we are looking at do not know are being undertaken. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that Mr. or Mrs. X would know that their DNA was being retained for eight years, rather than six. If we said, Actually, Mr. X, your DNA is being retained, Mr. X would know that we knew that he was involved in some aspect of terrorism. I am sorry, but that is one of those rubs where the interests of the majority are put against the interests of the few.

James Brokenshire: I understand the difficulty that the Minister of State is trying to address and the need, at times, for covert surveillance and the other important work of the security services. In the light of what he said to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, how does he intend to address a request from someone under proposed new section 64ZM?
If a person makes a request to the...chief officer...to be notified when anything relating to the person is destroyed under any of sections 64ZA to 64ZJ, the...chief officer...or a person authorised by the chief officer or on the chief officers behalf must within three months of the request issue the person with a certificate recording the destruction.
That may require further consideration in Committee, because if someone, thinking that their DNA profile would be deleted at the end of the six-year period, were to make a formal request to the chief officer, some response would be required. Formal notification might have to be given at that point, under the clause.

Tom Brake: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

James Brokenshire: I am intervening on the Minister.

David Hanson: I shall look at those issues. I shall happily give way to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington, if he wishes.

Tom Brake: On that point, I am not sure whether I am misreading the provisions, but clearly new section 64ZN excludes new section 64ZK, and therefore people would, I assume, not expect a response.

David Hanson: My colleagues and I have heard hon. Members comments, and we shall look at the issue and decide whether we need to provide clarifications in Committee.
The key thing is that even the Marper judgment recognised the seriousness of terrorism and terrorist offences, and a legitimacy in retaining the relevant data. The hon. Member for Hornchurch acknowledged that this morning. Any chief officer who authorises retention after six years must do so in a responsible way that is compatible with the European convention on human rights, and in a way that relates to any changes in the national security situation. I do not expect this to happen, but I should be extremely concerned if an individual whose profile, because of national security issues, was retained for another 12 months after the six years, had their profile kept on for a seventh or eighth year when they were of no more interest to the security services. There are checks and balances in the system.
I shall reflect on the discussions. However, we sometimes need to consider retaining DNA after the six-year period if there is continuing interest in an individual from whom the community needs to be protected, and in defined national security circumstances. That is shown particularly by Northern Ireland, but also by violent extremism in other forms, not least Islamist and animal rights extremism and racially motivated extremist activity.
There is an overlap between national security and terrorism, but they are not synonymous. To use the example of animal rights terrorists, there might not be national security implications, but one of our major concerns would be terrorist activity. The wording in new sections 64ZK and 64ZN is deliberate, to ensure that we recognise those instances. I shall reflect on what is said in Committee, and if clarification is needed, we can consider whether to table amendments. I hope that hon. Members understand the need for the clause. I ask the hon. Member for Hornchurch to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire: I appreciate what the Minister has said. An important aspect of any such provision is the clarity of the language used. The Minister has explained the scope of the Governments intended interpretation of national security. My residual concern about not including that clarification in the Bill is that a court would only in certain limited circumstances refer to Hansard to interpret legislation, if the language could be interpreted in a particular way.
I shall reflect on what the Minister said, with regard to whether to draft a definition or simply rely on his statement this afternoon about the understanding of the breadth of, and intention behind, the term national security. There are understandable concerns, in the light of some of the highlighted cases, about the distinction that has been drawn between terrorism and national security. Again, I understand and shall reflect on what the Minister said about animal rights terrorism, which may not be a national security issue, and the need to make that explicit and draw it out. However, in the interests of reassuring the public about the use of the power and the two-year retention, we should reflect on the definitional issues, and I am grateful to the Minister for undertaking to do that.
The issues of oversight are also key. I imagine that such a power would be used in exceptional circumstances; it would not be the norm. The Minister has said nothing to the contrary, and I would have been concerned if he had. However, there is a need for clarity on these issues. I respect what the Minister has said about the work that is still to come on oversight and his promise to look at the point that I highlighted in relation to proposed new clause 64ZM on the relevant distinctions that are drawn in certain circumstances and the requirement to notify about destruction.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington was right to highlight that the relevant section is not covered. If someone knew that their DNA had been retained and a profile had been made, and the expectation was that it would be deleted after six years, that person might seek notification under the provisions. So what might the response need to be? While I accept the point that he raised about the drafting, I am not sure that the broader issue is addressed. I raise that to help our consideration of these provisions, because we all want to get this right. If there are those who would use malign intent against innocent civilians in this country, we should consider very carefully all the powers that are available to protect against that. In the light of the Ministers comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 37, in clause 14, page 36, line 38, leave out
samples, fingerprints or impressions of footwear
and insert fingerprints. (Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment alters the substituted section 64ZK(4)(a) of PACE to remove the erroneous reference to samples and impressions of footwear because this section is only intended to provide for the retention for purposes of national security of DNA profiles and fingerprints and not samples or impressions of footwear.

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment 152, in clause 14, page 38, leave out lines 4 to 16.
The amendment relates to new section 64ZN, which provides for the use of any retained material under section 64 of PACE, such as DNA samples and fingerprints. The definition in section 64 includes materials that are
taken in connection with the investigation of an offence with the consent of the person from whom they were taken.
That covers a broad swathe of materialsnot simply DNA or other materials that are taken by virtue of an arrest power, but those that may have been volunteered to assist in an investigation.
Proposed new section 64ZN allows material to be used for national security reasons, terrorist investigations, the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or identifying a deceased person. Subsection (3) allows for the material to be disclosed to any person. It further provides that the definition of crime includes criminal offences committed outside the UK, which do not also have to be criminal offences in the UK. That is obviously quite broad; it would seem to permit the sharing of DNA profilesor the DNA samples themselves, before they are required to be destroyedwith foreign law enforcement agencies, whether in the EU or elsewhere, with regard to something that was not a crime in this country and that might relate to the national security of a foreign country. That may or may not be appropriate.
Certainly, there are significant issues around the concept of dual criminality. Let us look at extradition: normally, the broad principle is that, for extradition to take place, the actions would have to amount to a criminal offence in both jurisdictions. That is not reflected in the drafting here. A request for information could, seemingly, be made by any country in the world when someone is suspected of being involved in a crime there, even though those actions are not regarded as criminal or a breach of the law in this country.
Why does there appear to be that imbalance in the drafting? How would the power be used? The language appears to be broad enough to cover the sort of scenario that I have mentioned. It will be interesting to hear the Ministers response. He may say, That is not our intention. There will be protocols that will need to be framed within bilateral treaties or other regulations. At the very least, it would be beneficial to put that on the record, so that we can understand more effectively the sharing power in the context of the use of retained material. In principle, we are talking about genetic materialthe sample provided. The Governments desire to destroy samples within six months shows that they have rightly understood the concerns about misuse and the need to keep information secure.
Proposed new clause 64ZN would appear to allow material to be shared with someone else. Is that the intention? What circumstances are contemplated? What protocols would the Government adopt with foreign Governments for the use of the power? Is it intended that the situation would be captured by, for example, the existing mutual assistance regime? It may well be that it is. Is the power much broader than that in its scope and application?

Tom Brake: I can see where the hon. Gentleman is going. Presumably, he would like some assurances that if the Iranian authorities, for instance, sought an exchange after a demonstration in Tehran, because they thought there might be DNA material in the UK, the Government would not comply.

James Brokenshire: It is pushing the language to its furthest degree, but, in isolation, the Bill would appear to allow that type of sharing. It would be constrained by treaty obligations and other mutual assurance, but it would be helpful to state that formally in relation to these provisions, so that everybody is clear about the intentions and purposes behind the clause on the sharing of such material.
We are again getting into the issue of data security. Close and careful examination needs to be given to sharing data with somebody else. We may have designed systems to keep data safe and secure that are robust and cannot be hacked into, and that ensure that insiders in an organisation could not misapply their authority to use the material wholly inappropriately. Consideration needs to be given to whether those standards would be applied by the person with whom the information is being shared.

Tom Brake: I assume that the hon. Gentleman would also like reassurance that if a request came in it could not be of a scale that would allow another Government to trawl. It would have to be a specific request for DNA relating to one individual. If it were much wider, what safeguards would there be to prevent that Government from using that much wider sample for other purposes?

James Brokenshire: It is a question of getting clarification, and I have fastened on that matter especially because it applies to information that is being volunteered. We are not necessarily talking about someone who has been arrested in relation to a crime; the information is simply being volunteered by someone to assist with an investigation. The provision seems to spill over into that sort of material as well. It has a very broad ambit, which goes beyond some of our earlier debates. Volunteered information can be destroyed and consent can be withdrawn, but the provisions would be operative until consent was withdrawn. It is important to understand the intention because we are talking about sensitive materialsomeones genetic codingin the DNA sample provided. There seem to be no safeguards or oversight in relation to that, and I have tabled a further amendment that speaks to my concern. It would be helpful to gain clarification on the intent of the provision, how it will be used and what safeguards and other measures are in place to address some of the concerns that might arise.

David Hanson: The essential impact of the amendment would be to prevent the sharing of data with authorities outside the areas covered by the BillEngland and Wales. Our colleague authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland would not be able to access DNA under a data-sharing arrangement. In the UK context, many investigations in Scotland have an impact on England and vice versa, and similarly with Northern Ireland.
The hon. Gentleman has raised some key issues, however, about security and safety. First and foremost, I am working with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State on a range of issues that follow from the PrĂ1/4m convention, which was signed on 27 May 2005 by a number of European nation partners, and adopted in June 2008 after the Council decision that implemented the agreement. That would effectively mean that it will increasingly be possible to look at cross-border agreements on tackling serious crime, drugs, trafficking and a whole range of key issues, in the fight against not just terrorism but cross-border crime and illegal immigration. Crime is not individual nation-orientated. We regularly receive searches against a profile or a crime scene for a DNA sample from foreign law enforcement agencies, and they are dealt with through Interpol or the United Kingdom National Central Bureau in the Serious Organised Crime Agency, which falls under my hon. Friends jurisdiction. That body complies with requests when it deems them necessary, using the partnership criteria to help to reduce crime. That is a fair and useful assessment of the issues.
The situation will certainly occur with countries outside the EU. We have mutual legal assistance treaties or bilateral agreements with a number of countries, on sharing information to help reduce crime and make convictions. Two countries with which we currently have mutual legal assistance treaties are the United States of America and Canada. Under the proposed legislation, individuals data will be shared with other countries in the United Kingdom, in Europe and elsewhere. However, like all the provisions, it is meant to ensure that we crack down on crime, bring criminals to justice, give justice to victims and co-operate with partner countries in Europe and elsewhere to achieve those objectives.
I hope the amendment is simply for clarification. If I accepted it, we would not be able to share information with Scotland, Northern Ireland, Europe or mutual legal assistance countries outside Europe. That is important in the fight against crime, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Tom Brake: For the sake of clarity, will the Minister confirm that if the measure is passed, in cases outside Europe or the US and Canada, the Government would have to come to an agreement with each individual country about whether the provisions applied?

David Hanson: Yes. We already have mutual legal assistance or bilateral agreements with a range of countries on crime-fighting measures. I gave the examples of the USA and Canada, but there are others. Such arrangements are negotiated by Governments, signed by Governments and open to public scrutiny, and they can be asked about in the House of Commons. Ultimately, they will form the basis for the sharing of information. Self-evidently, if we do not have an agreement with a country, we will not share information with it.

James Brokenshire: I hear what the Minister says. The amendment was intended as a probing amendment to tease out some of the detail and the thought behind the clause and how it would be used.
However, I have two remaining concerns, notwithstanding what the Minister said. The first involves the dual criminality point and the fact that the clause as drafted does not require the offence to be recognised as such in both jurisdictions. The second relates to materials that have been volunteered. If someone simply volunteers information without being arrested, that will also be captured by the provisions on sharing relevant materials.
I accept that some sharing might be appropriate and required, under certain constraints. The Minister discussed the Scottish authorities and some European partners, and I hope that we will discuss the detail of the PrĂ1/4m treaty and its potential implications shortly. How will the provisions be constrained? What safeguards will provide data protection, and what checks will the Government undertake before enabling the power to be used in the way described?
I will not press my amendment to a vote, but those concerns remain, although I heard what the Minister said. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to consider clause 15 stand part.

James Brokenshire: We have gone through a significant amount of detail relating to the clause, so I do not intend to repeat it, as that would not be in the Committees interests. However, I would like to raise with the Minister a few additional points for clarification.
The first relates to the rights of challenge to retention, which the Minister alluded to during a previous debate. Currently, individuals who seek to have the police remove their DNA records must apply to individual chief constables. Under current ACPO guidance, that will happen only in exceptional circumstances. Obviously, a uniform approach is not being applied. Some police forces refuse to remove any records once a case is closed, while others refuse more than four in five records. The result is that there is a big difference depending simply on the area of the country where someone lives.
Some freedom of information requests to police forces have highlighted that stark difference between forces. Results provided to us show that in south Yorkshire, which has the highest request success rate, 83 per cent. of requests are granted, whereas some forces refuse to remove any profiles at all. It is very much a lottery, in terms of which approach is taken by a force.
It is a matter of concern that where someone lives should affect their ability to have their DNA information removed from the record, and what the scope and ambit of that ability would be. The issue was raised by the Home Secretary in his statement in November 2009, when he said:
Currently, chief officers may consider the exceptional destruction of DNA and fingerprints under the exceptional case procedure. We propose to introduce greater transparency by setting out in statute more clearly defined criteria where deletion would be appropriate. This should bring greater clarity to the public and also the police.[Official Report, 11 November 2009; Vol. 499, c. 27WS.]
That is not currently reflected in the Bill at all, as far as I can see. The Government may be giving the issue further consideration and, as the Minister of State told us this afternoon, a concept of judicial oversight may be applied in relation to challenges and requests to have information removed.
However, it seems odd that there is nothing at all in that regard on the face of the Bill. Even if one were not seeking the clarification of the judicial oversight that the Minister of State referred to, there are not the requirements, procedures or relevant steps that the Home Secretary highlighted in his initial statement. I would like to understand why that is the case. I would like to know if it is the Governments intention to fulfil the ideas behind the Bill as set out in the Home Secretarys comments last November. Will that intention be reflected in the Bill and, if so, when will the Government introduce amendments or proposals to give it effect?
Regarding the whole approach on records and DNA material, we also have the issue of the quality of the information that is retained. The Government said very clearlythey highlighted their case and made it stronglythat the issue is about bringing criminals to justice. I share that intent and the principle behind it. Obviously, however, there have been errors in the past and I would be grateful if the Minister of State could confirm that in August 2007, there were more than 500,000 records with wrongly recorded or incorrectly spelled names and that in May 2007, 26,200 DNA records were not loaded, with the result that there were 183 undetected crimes. Can he confirm that that information is correct?
I appreciate that remedial action has been taken by the National Policing Improvement Agency to address accuracy, but it will clearly continue to be an issue. Can the Minister of State tell us the measures that he intends to put in place to maintain the quality and accuracy of information in records on the national DNA database, to ensure that errors are avoided and crimes can be properly detected as a consequence of accurately recorded information?
Taking a broader perspective, there is a difference between our party and the Government. Obviously, we have put on record our differing views and we will see how the issue develops. At the very least, I look forward to the Ministers response to the two specific points he may be able to help me with, even if he is not able to help on the broader approach and on our differences and disagreement on relevant aspects and retention periods.

Shona McIsaac: I am pleased that the Opposition amendments have not been accepted. I fear that had they been accepted, fewer criminals would be brought to justice. There is a flipside to the argument. We have been focusing on people being apprehended for crimes, but DNA and a robust DNA database can also clear people of crimes. It gives an additional tool for the police and authorities to eliminate people from their inquiries. I do not think that one Opposition Member touched on that aspect of having a DNA database.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch has concentrated a lot on Scotland. As I pointed out during an intervention, the Scottish legal system is completely different from the English one in that there are three possible verdicts. Being found not guilty in Scotland is different from being found not guilty in England, because cases in Scotland can be deemed not proven. I would hazard a guess that if that verdict was available to juries in the English system, many cases in which people are currently found not guilty would in fact be not proven.

Simon Burns: The hon. Lady said that there is a considerable difference between being found not guilty in Scotland and being found not guilty in England. I do not understand that. I assume that if one is found not guilty in Scotland, it is identical to being found not guilty in England. However, if a jury has a problem making its mind up, it can decide that the case is not proven, which is totally different from being found not guilty.

Shona McIsaac: I think I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. However, a couple of years ago, I spent a large part of the summer recess on jury service and the cases I had to decide upon were serious sexual offences. There were two separate and serious casesboth harrowingin which the accused were found not guilty, but as I know the Scottish legal system, I hazard a guess

Frank Cook: Order. With utmost respect to all members of the Committee and to the hon. Lady in particular, I do not want the debate to go down the path of a comparative debate on the Scottish and English systems. Unless the Minister tells me differently, the Bill relates specifically to England and Wales, so I would prefer to avoid the comparisons that are surfacing.

Shona McIsaac: I totally accept that, Mr. Cook. However, in mitigation, I was prompted to mention Scotland because the Opposition seem to rely on the Scottish system so much to justify their amendments. A robust DNA database is about justice for the victims of serious crimes. Having been a member of a jury hearing the gruesome details of such crimes, I am pleased that we have a DNA database and that the DNA of those found not guilty of those crimes is still in the system.
All the evidence relating to those arrested at a young age for sexual offences suggests that by their nature sexual offences tend to escalate over subsequent years. Patterns of sexual offending occur. That is why we must keep DNA records for the length of time the Government are suggesting. With all respect to the Liberal Democrats, I would be horrified to think, in the light of the evidence I heard in court, that no DNA record was kept of the crimes those people had committed.

Tom Brake: I shall not go over ground already extensively covered. We have had an in-depth discussion about some of the fundamental principles around DNA retention. Clearly, there are fundamental differences of opinion about how best to address the issue. We could possibly trade insults about whose crime policy is the most effective at tackling crime. In my view, spending money on identity cards is not as effective as spending money on police officers, but that is the decision the Government have taken.
I asked in the Home Affairs Committee whether there were any studies of the cost-effectiveness of the national DNA database as a tool to prevent and detect crime. In a letter, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department answered,
Having looked into this issue, we are not aware of any independent cost/benefit analysis ever being commissioned on the effectiveness of the NDNAD.
If we want to trade insults about whose crime policy is the most effective, I will pray in aid what that Minister said about the national DNA database.
I hope the Minister of State will respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Hornchurch about the postcode lottery for people who want their DNA deleted for exceptional reasons. We are strong supporters of police operational independence in each force area when it comes to how, where and in what numbers they deploy officers and what their local priorities are. It is, however, difficult to see why police forces require different approaches to deleting DNA from the database in exceptional circumstances. I hope we can get some response from the Minister on that point. It is clearly of great concern to people up and down the country, when they see different percentages of people being successful, or not, at having their DNA removed from the database when exceptional circumstances apply.

David Hanson: We have had a long debate about clause 14 but I maintain the arguments I put before: clause 14 as constituted is a useful tool in the protection of British citizens against crime; is proportionate, in line with European judgments; and is an effective way of bringing individuals to justice. By deleting clause 14, we will delete the option to retain DNA of convicted and innocent people for a period of six years. I hope that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington will not be voting to do that. He has raised some important points and this remains an important issue for me.
The hon. Gentleman raised criticisms of the clause and its possible operation in practice. Abdul Azad was arrested for violent disorder in a Birmingham home in February 2005 and although he was released without charge, a DNA sample was taken from him. Some time after that, a stranger rape occurred in Stafford, 25 miles away. Whatever the human rights considerations, thanks to DNA evidence taken when he had not been charged, he was found guilty of that stranger rape and is now serving six years in prison for sexual assault. If I were the victim of Mr. Azad, I would sing hallelujah for the DNA database at the top of my voice. I say to the hon. Gentleman that that is one of many cases that I could cite, as could my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State. We could fill the next 45 minutes giving examples of individuals who are in prison because the DNA database has been operationalbut we will not do so, Mr. Cook.
We have had a very good debate. I hope that during the course of the debate the Committee has sensed that I feel passionately, as does my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes, that we are in the business of bringing justice to victims of crime. We are in the business of putting bad people away for crimes that they have committed. If the DNA database helps us do that, proportionately and in line with European judgments, then we should do so.
It is not just guilty people that we are putting away as a result of the DNA database. As my hon. Friend mentioned, there are occasions when innocent people are not put in prison because of the database. I cannot name the individuals involved, because we have not yet had permission to do so, but in 2007 a British malecall him male Awas arrested for criminal damage and released without charge. His DNA was taken and loaded on to the database. Some time later an allegation of rape was made against another malemale Bwho was arrested, charged and remanded in custody based on that allegation of rape. Samples from the crime scene were sent to the national database for matching. The samples from male B, who was alleged by the individual to have committed the rape, was found not to match. The crime scene samples matched with male A and he was subsequently convicted; male B was released. It is not just about ensuring that the guilty go to prison. Sometimes, as my hon. Friend pointed out, it is about ensuring that the innocent do not.

Douglas Hogg: I rise to reinforce the Ministers point. There have been one or two cases in the Court of Appeal where convictions were quashed many years after the date of conviction because the DNA evidence established that the person convicted many years before was in fact not guilty.

David Hanson: There are a number of points to make on that, but I go back to what Sir Hugh Orde said in his evidence to the Committee. He said that the DNA database puts an individual in a place and at a time, and they have to do some explaining. The jury will look at that information, look at the explanation and determine whether they were in that place for purposes of criminal intent. The debate on clause 14 is about the proportionality of the Government proposal and its compliance with human rights law. I believe that what we have proposed complies with human rights law, is proportional, and that the alternatives that we have debated and rejected so far would not be appropriate.
There are still important points to discuss. We need to ensure that we have the consistency that the hon. Member for Hornchurch mentioned. We are working with ACPO to develop guidance in light of the new policy and, in particular, to improve consistency in the operation of the procedure to delete profiles ahead of the normal retention period, in certain circumstances. We will bring forward that guidance with ACPO shortly, subject to the completion of the Bills passage through both Houses of Parliament.

James Brokenshire: The Minister of State says that he is developing guidance on the removal of DNA profiles from the system. However, the Home Secretary said that it would in essence be put into statute. Why has there been a change of approach on that?

David Hanson: It may well be that the guidance ultimately has statutory backing. Often, guidance is given to chief police officers that is of such importance that it has statutory backing that they are minded to support, rather than voluntary guidance and operation guidance. We are currently working on that and we will bring forward proposals shortly.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch mentioned a number of figures in relation to his concerns, but neither I nor my officials recognise those figures. We work continuously with the National Police Improvement Agency to ensure that police forces and forensic science provide accurate data for the database. I will not be complacent. We need to ensure that the database is as near perfect as possible as a major crime-fighting tool, and we will continue to work on that.
There are safeguards built into the proposed legislation. In new section 64ZI of PACE subsections (5)(a) to (d) list the criteria that chief constables must apply to ensure as much standardisation as possible across the country. Samples must be destroyed immediately if it appears to the chief officer that the arrest or the taking of fingerprints was unlawful, the arrest was based on mistaken identity, or circumstances relating to the arrest mean that it is appropriate to destroy the material. There are a number of such references in the Bill. We want to ensure that there is guidance in due course and that we help to support that consistency, which is important if we are to avoid a postcode DNA lottery.
Finally, Mr. Deputy SpeakerI have said Mr. Deputy Speaker again. I apologise Mr. Cook, it has been a long week, all of which I have spent in Committee or on the Floor of the House. The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington said that we should compare our crime policies. DNA is an important tool. That should be coupled with the fact that every member of the Committee has more police officers and more resources in policing in their constituencies than ever before. We have presided over record falls in crime8 per cent.and record numbers of police. I will keep to the clause under debate, Mr. Cook, because I respect your chairmanship and your integrity in these matters, but I am responding to the debate. All of that is of no use if we allow people to get away with crimes because we do not have an effective database that is proportionate on the lines of the Europe decision. That is what clause 14 provides, and I urge my hon. Friends to support it.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Material subject to the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989

Amendments made: 38, in clause 15, page 39, line 7, leave out arrested for or.

This amendment alters the substituted article 64(5)(b) of PACE (NI) to remove the erroneous repeated reference to an arrest under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as this is already provided for under the substituted article 64(5)(a).
Amendment 131, in clause 15, page 40, line 24, leave out of a recordable offence and insert
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(b) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment amends new Article 64ZC of PACE (NI) to provide that the destruction regime in that section (persons subject to control orders) ceases to have effect if the person is convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 132, in clause 15, page 40, line 25, at end insert
( ) For the purposes of paragraph (1)
(a) a person has no previous convictions if the person has not previously been convicted
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the person has been previously convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence other than a qualifying offence, committed when the person is aged under 18.
( ) For the purposes of that paragraph
(a) a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if
(i) he has been given a caution in England and Wales or Northern Ireland in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, he has admitted, or
(ii) he has been warned or reprimanded under section 65 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for the offence, and
(b) if a person is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction.
( ) In this Article
(a) recordable offence has, in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) qualifying offence has, in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, the meaning given by section 65A of that Act..

This amendment amends new Article 64ZC of PACE so that where a person already has a conviction in England and Wales for a recordable offence, or in Scotland for an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, the destruction regime in that section (persons subject to control order) does not apply.
Amendment 133, in clause 15, page 45, line 38, after Article 64ZB insert , or Articles 64ZD. (Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment is consequential on amendments 131 and 132.

Question put, That clause 15, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Material subject to the Terrorism Act 2000

Amendments made: 114, in clause 16, page 49, line 15, after Ireland, insert , or
( ) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment alters the substituted paragraph 14B(5) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to provide that the destruction regime in that paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if the person is convicted of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 115, in clause 16, page 50, line 12, after Ireland, insert , or
( ) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment alters the substituted paragraph 14C(5) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to provide that the destruction regime in that paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if the person is convicted of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 116, in clause 16, page 51, line 12, after Ireland, insert , or
( ) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment alters the substituted paragraph 14D(5) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to provide that the destruction regime in that paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if the person is convicted of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 117, in clause 16, page 52, line 6, after Ireland, insert , or
( ) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment alters the substituted paragraph 14E(5) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to provide that the destruction regime in that paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if the person is convicted of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 118, in clause 16, page 52, line 11, after offence,, insert or
( ) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment,.

This amendment alters what is meant by no previous convictions in the new destruction regime under paragraphs 14B to 14E of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. The regime will not apply where a person has a conviction for an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment.
Amendment 119, in clause 16, page 52, line 12, leave out so.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 120.
Amendment 120, in clause 16, page 52, line 13, after offence, insert
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.

This amendment is consequential on the policy in amendment 118 that a conviction for an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment allows for indefinite retention of material held under the Terrorism Act 2000; it differentiates the different concepts used in the law in England and Wales.
Amendment 121, in clause 16, page 52, line 27, after caution, insert
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland. (Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment is consequential on the policy in amendment 118. It provides that, in relation to the new destruction regime under the Terrorism Act 2000, a conviction only includes a caution where the conviction took place in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, not Scotland.

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 16, page 53, line 8, leave out any material and insert fingerprints or a DNA profile.

This amendment narrows the scope of the provision allowing for longer periods of retention for the purposes of national security so that it applies only to fingerprints and DNA profiles (as was always the policy intention) - and not to samples.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 40 to 44, 123, 122 and 124 to 127.
Government new clause 19Material subject to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Government new clause 20Material subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Scotland).
Government new clause 21Material subject to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Scotland).

David Hanson: The amendments relate to the introduction of regimes for the destruction of fingerprints and DNA material. Amendments 39 to 44 cover materials subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 and correct drafting errors in the Billsadly, it does occasionally happen. New clauses 19 to 21 relate to the same subject: the applicability of the proposed regimes for the retention, destruction and use of relevant physical data and DNA material in Scotland under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The new clauses deal with the extension of the scheme to samples taken in Scotland, which it was not possible to achieve before we introduced the Bill.

James Brokenshire: The Minister has explained that the amendments extend the ambit to Scotland. It would be helpful to have confirmation on the record that the Government discussed the provisions with the Scottish Government. What was the nature of those arrangements?

David Hanson: I confirm that discussions have been undertaken and that the Scottish Government are content.

Amendment 39 agreed to.

Amendments made: 40, in clause 16, page 53, line 19, leave out or samples.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 39.
Amendment 41, in clause 16, page 53, line 20, leave out such a sample and insert
a sample taken in England and Wales.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 39.
Amendment 42, in clause 16, page 53, line 21, leave out samples or.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 39.
Amendment 43, in clause 16, page 53, line 25, leave out or samples.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 39.
Amendment 44, in clause 16, page 53, line 26, leave out such a sample and insert a sample taken in Northern Ireland.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 39.
Amendment 123, in clause 16, page 54, line 25, leave out paragraph (b) and insert
(b) material to which paragraph 20(3) applies,.

This amendment is consequential on NC20.
Amendment 122, in clause 16, page 55, line 39, leave out 53A and insert 2(2). (Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment corrects a drafting error.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Material subject to the International Criminal Court Act 2001

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Other material

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 18, page 57, line 12, leave out taken and insert obtained or acquired.

This amendment corrects a drafting error. The material to which section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies is that which is obtained or acquired by the law enforcement authority - not necessarily that which the authority itself takes.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 46 and 47.

David Hanson: Amendment 45 corrects another drafting error, for which I again apologise to the Committee. It relates to the provision that requires the destruction of a DNA sample within six months or sooner. The material to which section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies is that which is obtained or acquired by the law enforcement authority, not necessarily that which the authority itself takes and the amendment simply reflects that.
Amendments 46 and 47 change the person responsible for making any determination that it is necessary to retain DNA profiles or fingerprints held under section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act beyond the usual retention period for the purposes of national security from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service to the responsible officer. The latter is the most senior officer or person in the police force or other law enforcement authority that is responsible for the retention of the data. That is a simple name change and I hope that Committee will accept all three amendments.

Amendment 45 agreed to.

Amendments made: 46, in clause 18, page 57, line 41, leave out Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and insert responsible officer.

This amendment changes the person responsible for making a determination that it is necessary to retain material held under section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 beyond the usual retention period for the purposes of national security - from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service to the responsible officer.
Amendment 47, in clause 18, page 58, line 3, at end insert
( ) Responsible officer means
(a) in relation to material obtained or acquired by a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of the police force;
(b) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the Police Service of Northern Ireland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
(c) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(d) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police or the Royal Air Force Police, the Provost Marshal for the police force which obtained or acquired the material;
(e) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the British Transport Police, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police;
(f) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the Director General of the Serious Organised Crime Agency;
(g) in relation to material obtained or acquired by the Commissioners for Her Majestys Revenue and Customs, any of those Commissioners.. (Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment defines who is the responsible officer for the purposes of making a determination about retention of material for the purposes of national security - it is the most senior office or person in the law enforcement authority responsible for the material.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Destruction of material taken before commencement

Amendment made: 124, in clause 19, page 59, line 42, leave out to 18 and insert
, 15, 16, [Material subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Scotland)], 17, [Material subject to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Scotland)] and 18.(Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment is consequential on NC20 and NC21.

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 19, page 60, line 18, leave out subsection (5) and insert
(5) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (4) above shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament..
This is a testing amendment to gain clarity. The clause deals with the destruction of material taken before the commencement of the Bill and provides that various DNA profiles and other records will be destroyed. I imagine that that is in part to reflect the broader intent behind certain other provisions relating to items being destroyed within six months. I wish to test the Minister on the provision in clause 19 to ensure that it is clearly understood that the order-making power that he seeks is intended to give effect to equivalent provisions. In other words, I hope that it is not intended to extend or provide a different regime than that expressed by the Bill in relation to samples that may be taken after it comes into force. If that were the case, the negative procedure would not be appropriate, so the amendment seeks that confirmation and clarity. The clause introduces some standardisation between the period before and after the Bill comes into force.

David Hanson: I hope I can provide the clarity that the hon. Gentleman seeks. If we accepted the amendment, we would have to use the affirmative procedure. I assure him on the points that he has made. The Bill suggests the negative procedure, which will give more flexibility than an affirmative one, which is a stringent form of parliamentary scrutiny that would be unnecessary in the circumstances.

Simon Burns: Can the Minister define flexibility and the need for it? In opposition, the Labour Members usually very keen on the affirmative rather than negative procedure, and, since we have been in opposition, we have been extremely keen on the affirmative procedure. However, I have never heard a Minister of any party talk about flexibility.

David Hanson: In the Bill, we have indicated that the negative procedure is to be used. The amendment would allow for the affirmative procedure, but we believe that the negative procedure is better. However, on matters unrelated to the issue under discussion, the negative and/or the affirmative procedure can be used in a range of circumstances. As a Minister, I have proposed use of both procedures. We wish to look at the matters in a flexible way and the Bill states that the negative procedure should be used.
I will put on record the intention to use the power to apply the same regime to existing DNA profiles as to those taken after the Bill becomes law. It is a clear matter. There is parliamentary scrutinythat is the key point. If either the hon. Member for Hornchurch or the hon. Member for West Chelmsford is not happy with a negative resolution on a particular matter then, as I recall from my 18 years in the House, they can move that it become an affirmative resolution. That can be done. That is what I mean by flexibility. It can be done under parliamentary process.

James Brokenshire: I hear and am grateful for the Minister of States clarification of how the power would be used. We tabled the probing amendment to gain that clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

National DNA Database Strategy Board

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 20, page 60, line 22, at end insert
to report on its effectiveness and to make recommendations on the use of DNA profiles..

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 30, in clause 20, page 60, line 23, leave out publish and insert lay before Parliament.
Amendment 31, in clause 20, page 60, line 24, at end insert and its membership.
Amendment 32, in clause 20, page 60, line 26, at end add to Parliament.
Amendment 33, in clause 20, page 60, line 26, at end add
(3) The National DNA Database Strategy Board shall also have responsibility for monitoring the sharing of information held on the National DNA database with other agencies and organisations and to make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of State..
Clause stand part.

James Brokenshire: We now come on to the oversight of the national DNA database by its strategy board. The clause states:
(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for a National DNA Database Strategy Board to oversee the operation of the National DNA database.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish
(a) the governance rules of the National DNA Database Strategy Board, and
(b) the reporting requirements of the Board.
The amendments seek to push that a little further.
The clause merely states that there will be oversight of the operation, but it is a question of being specific and gaining clarity about what that means. It should mean that the board will report on the effectiveness of the operation of the national DNA database and that it will make recommendations to the Secretary of State or to Parliament on that. That would seem to be a fairly key aspect of the work. It seems appropriate to specify that clearly in the Bill, rather than the Secretary of State having the flexibility to publish governance rules without necessarily saying what they are intended to relate to. The process would appear to be internally driven, and to relate to the governance of the board, rather than it being about expounding, explaining and putting in statute the rights of the national DNA database strategy board itself.
If it is not intended to specify in the Bill that the board will make recommendations on the operation of the national DNA database and its effectiveness what is the purpose of the board? There is also no indication as to the boards membership, its breadth, whether there will be certain qualifications or whether it is intended to have representation from particular organisations. Again, it would be helpful to have those intentions set out, even if it is in some form of code or guidance that sits alongside the Bill. I hope that the Minister can tell us more about that.
There is also the issue of the relationship between the board and the National Policing Improvement Agency, which effectively manages the day-to-day operation of the national DNA database. I presume that the NPIA makes reports and recommendations. What is its interrelationship with the strategy board intended to be? Do the Government intend that there should be some sort of framework or protocol between the NPIA and the national DNA database strategy board, regarding operational effectiveness and relative roles and responsibility relating to the analysis, examination and provision of data and information? That has been a sensitive issue, as we have seen from the nature of the debates in Committee today.
There should be some mechanism to facilitate consideration and debate within Parliament on the effectiveness and the operation of the national DNA database. If reports are produced by the board, they should not be simply sent to the Secretary of State. There should be a role for Parliament and feedback provided, so that we are clear about the boards proposals, recommendations and insights. We could reflect on those in Parliament and decide whether changes needed to be made and whether any other steps might be required.

Douglas Hogg: My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. May I make a suggestion? One could contemplate the board always having to send its reports to the Select Committee on Home Affairs, or perhaps the Justice Committee. That would enable that Committee to reflect on whether it wanted to scrutinise more carefully. That is a suggestion that the Minister might care to consider.

James Brokenshire: My right hon. and learned Friend makes a helpful point. As he will probably be aware, the Home Affairs Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry into the retention of DNA data. It would certainly facilitate that sort of discussion and scrutiny if the recommendations or reports of the board were forwarded in that way. It is a question of providing something practical, ensuring that Parliament is kept in the loop, and ensuring that appropriate scrutiny is applied to any recommendations that come from the board.
Given the debate that we had on a preceding amendment about the Government sharing data with the Scottish authority and other bodies or agencies, we should be clear that the oversight should apply equally to how that power is used, for the reasons and concerns that I set out in the preceding debate. The Minister may argue that the oversight of the national DNA database will be broad enough to cover that sort of arrangement. However, if there is sharing, the practical implications and effects need to be kept under close review, because of the sensitive nature of the information and the need to keep that data secure and protected from misuse.
The sharing of data more widely on an international basis leads to mention of the PrĂ1/4m treaty, which the Minister referred to in the preceding debate. That treaty provides for the sharing of data on the national DNA database with EU partners. The Minister mentioned that the treaty had come into effect and that there is, therefore, a sharing of fingerprint, DNA and vehicle registration data by law enforcement authorities across the EU. The treaty permits data to be transmitted and searched through a member states national database.
In its report on the PrĂ1/4m treaty before it came into effect, the House of Lords European Union Committee noted:
The threshold for holding DNA profiles on the United Kingdom DNA database is far lower than in any other Member State, and the proportion of the population on the database correspondingly far higher.
According to evidence presented to that Committee, the UK DNA database is half as large again as all the other member states databases put together; that was how the House of Lords Committee described it. That suggests how significant the size of the UK national DNA database is, compared to those of other EU nation states that are developing databases. The House of Lords Committee raised some concerns about that and the possible implications for sharing information. That is why I tabled my probing amendment about overseeing data sharing.
As the Minister has said, a wide range of different approaches are taken in other EU countries, but a significant number retain DNA only for very restricted periods, and in a much more restricted way than happens here. In the rest of the EU, DNA data are generally obtained and kept only in serious crimes. In the UK, those data can be retained for all recordable offences, which can be relatively minor compared to the offences that we are talking about in other EU countries. That is likely to lead to the United Kingdom engaging more widely in giving DNA data to our EU partners, rather than the data going in the other directionsimply because of the size of our database. That point was made by the House of Lords European Union Committee. It stated:
Officials of a country which holds DNA data only for serious crimes will inevitably start with the presumption that DNA data are held in the United Kingdom for the same purpose, and perhaps put at risk those whose DNA is held because they have committed only a minor crime, or perhaps no crime at all.
It would be interesting to know whether the Minister accepts the point that the Committee made. It seemed to highlight the possibly one-sided nature of the arrangement between an EU country with DNA records only of those who have committed serious crimes, and the UK, with the DNA data of those who may have committed relatively minor offences. There is a potential imbalance, with implications arising from the different thresholds applied across the EU, and from the size of the database.
That led the House of Lords Committee to make the following recommendation:
The threshold for holding DNA profiles on the United Kingdom DNA database is far lower than in any other Member State, and the proportion of the population on the database correspondingly far higher. The Government should as a matter of urgency examine the implications of DNA exchanges for those on the United Kingdom database.
It would be interesting to hear whether the Government have examined that issue, as the Lords Committee argued it should. Again, the issue is the potential implications of the sharing of data for costs and for law enforcement.
I recognise that there may be justifications for sharing the data, but the issue is the surrounding constraints and whether there will be a resource implication for this country, simply because of the rolling out of the PrĂ1/4m treaty. Will the Minister say how the introduction of the PrĂ1/4m treaty is progressing for the UK, and set out the practical implications to date? Will he confirm that all EU member states will have automatic access to Britains DNA database? I looked at the reply given to the European Union Committee by the then Minister, the right hon. Member for Enfield, North (Joan Ryan):
The UK (as with other Member States) will decide which profiles on the national database should be exposed to search requests from other member states. There need be no assumption that all profiles would be searched routinely under PrĂ1/4m...The results of any search request will be reported to the other member state on a hit no hit basis. Confirmation of the profile match may be provided, but no details which would provide the name or other personal details of the individual would be provided.
I would like confirmation of whether that statement on the application of the PrĂ1/4m treaty remains the case today. What has been the experience to date in respect of requests for the sharing of information on the national DNA database, as a consequence of any implementation on a hit-or-no-hit basis? What is the thought process on that? I hope that the Minister will respond specifically on the intended use and operation of the treaty.
The reply from the right hon. Member for Enfield, North, to the European Union Committee seemed to state that the operation of the PrĂ1/4m treaty and those data sharing requirements would have cost implications for the UK:
The Government believes that we have a suitable estimate of the start up costs of £31 million. This includes running costs for the first year, which we have considered to be around £2.5 million. We must however clarify that this is an estimate, and taking into account the changing nature of technology and the negotiation of the implementing agreement this is subject to change.
It would help if the Minister could provide some further indication of what the costs might be, and whether there has been any change in relation to that statement. What has the approach been, and what will it be, in relation to data sharing with our EU partners in the context of the PrĂ1/4m treaty, and has the way in which data sharing will work been examined?

Tom Brake: Members will be pleased to hear that I shall be brief. I simply wish to support amendment 29, which would amend clause 20 to read: The Secretary of State must make arrangements for a National DNA Database Strategy Board to oversee the operation of the National DNA Database to report on its effectiveness and to make recommendations on the use of the DNA profiles. I particularly commend the amendment to the Minister because it makes it very clear that one of the strategy board outputs will be to document the effectiveness, and presumably the cost-benefit, of the national database. That would presumably enable the Minister, the next time the question is posed once the strategy board is up and running, to demonstrate that the DNA database is a cost-effective way of tackling crime.

Alan Campbell: In discussions that the hon. Gentleman has had with victims or their families in cases that have been cleared up with the use of DNA, have they said that while they welcome the fact that the case was solved, they wonder whether it was good value for money?

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister for that intervention. As I said earlier, we could have an exchange across the Committee about the effectiveness or otherwise of different measures, but Mr. Cook would not allow that.
Clearly, the Minister is right that DNA is effective in certain cases, but other measures are effective as well. I have previously argued that giving police officers more training on dealing with rape cases may equally be a cost-effective way of tackling crimepotentially more cost-effective than providing more police officers or introducing preventive measures. We can have that debate, but it is clearly beyond the remit of what we are discussing today. I am happy for it to go on the record that I acknowledge that DNA clearly is of great assistance in many cases. However, that does not do away with the necessity for something like the strategy board to consider exactly how effective the DNA database is.
Members know of many examples. The hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham (Mr. Hands) gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee about the fact that many of his elderly relatives had their DNA taken in relation to a murder in which they were clearly very unlikely to have been involved in any shape or form. It is perfectly legitimate to ask questions about whether, in such cases, we should send police officers to another part of the country to collect DNA from people who are clearly not implicated in a murderelderly, female, senior citizens.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will acknowledge that we should be able to discuss these matters without throwing allegations across the Committee about people being soft on crime, which is what has been said covertly, if not overtly.

Douglas Hogg: I shall confine myself exactly to the language and contents of clause 20; I am sure that you will be pleased by that, Mr. Cook. There are only three points that I want to raise. The documents contemplated by the clause fall into two classes, which I shall deal with separately: the governance rules and the reporting requirements. I suspect that reporting requirements mean reports.
I would like the Under-Secretary to tell me what governance rules means. Governance could mean at least two things, maybe more. It could be concerned exclusively with the housekeeping arrangements of the board, and no more than that, by which I mean pay and rations, staffing and the like, or it could mean policy. My hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch alluded to the areas where policy issues could arise; for example, there is the issue of data exchange, such as that between EU countries and ourselves. Clearly, the functions of the board will be confined to the lawful functions provided for by the Bill, if enacted, but it may be that the board could implement policy at its discretionpolicy that the Act will not regulate. We are entitled to know whether the phrase governance rules in fact extends to the making of policy, or whether it just refers to internal regulationspay and rations and the like.
Let us assume, for the moment, that the rules extend to policy. They may do, for example on the exchange of information. The Minister of State is nodding. That is good of himI had better develop this bit of my argument now. He has confirmed that the rules extend to policy. That is important, because if they were simply about pay and rations, one might not be too concerned, although one might want to talk about the cost. Once they move on to policy, however, one becomes concerned.

David Hanson: The terms of reference of the board include developing policy, but I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will recall that, ultimately, Ministers are responsible for policy and can discuss those issues with the board.

Douglas Hogg: I do not doubt that for a moment, but the Ministers intervention reinforces my point. We are talking about the ability of the board, working with the Minister, to determine a line of policy, which, although within the statutory framework, is not prescribed by it. If that is trueit manifestly is, as the Minister has told us sowe need a proper system for publishing the governance rules in advance and enabling a lot of people, including all the institutions of Parliament, to comment.
What measures does the Minister have in mind for consultation and publication of draft governance rules, so that interested parties and stakeholders can express a view? I hate the word but it will do for these purposes. There is nothing to stop him, if he is still a Minister in a few weeks timeI do not want to make any unpleasant observations about thatfrom publishing them in draft. If they are significant and of a major kind, they could even be debated in draft. They could certainly be sent to the Home Affairs Committee in draft, and there are a lot of other stakeholders to whom the draft rules could and should be sent. My point is that I hope that the Minister has given serious thought to how he will consult before the rules are submitted in their final form.
Similar considerations apply to the reporting requirements. Apart from anything else, I suspect that they mean that the Secretary of State will determine how, to whom and how frequently the board will report. If the Minister of State nods, it always helps at this stage. I am not going to say that he is a nodding donkeythat would be extremely unkind. I ask rhetorically: let us assume that reporting requirements mean the ability of the Secretary of State to create a regime whereby the board has to report. If that is right, it is important, because we are entitled to ask to whom and how often the reports will be made, and how Parliament will have an opportunity to address them.
Those are all matters of substance, and the Minister of State should give the Committee the benefit of his preliminary intentions. We would like an input, Parliament would like an input and many others would like an input on precisely these questions. They are not my questionsI am not saying that they are of huge importance, but the ultimate working of the database and of the board is significant, especially given the fact that, as the Minister of State knows, the public are deeply concerned about the retention of DNA material.

David Hanson: I was interested to hear the comments of members of the Committee. First, I wish to put it on the record that, having been a Minister for 12 and a half years, I do not expect these to be the last eight weeks of my ministerial career. We will debate that shortly. My position is obviously in the gift of the Prime Minister, but I expect that he will be able to appoint Ministers before and after the general election.
It would be helpful if I outlined the boards current objectives and responsibilities. The board has a remit to work towards the most effective and efficient use of the DNA database, and to consider the impact and implications of future technological advances. Moreover, it crucially has a remit to build public confidence in the use of the database. The DNA database strategy board was formed in 2007 and one of the key issues is how we develop confidence.
The board currently has a number of responsibilities that can be broadly defined as developing the policy procedures and strategy of the national DNA database, the police elimination database and any separate DNA-related databases created for the purposes of identifying a deceased person or a body part. The development of policy procedures and strategy is devolved to the board, but Ministers will have an interest in it by introducing policy, as we are doing today.
The board also has oversight of the scientific operation of the Metropolitan police counter-terrorism database. It also considers applications for the release of data from the DNA database for academic research, which is important. The board has oversight of contracts, data security and exchange protocols, and it defines and reviews the level of security required for the storage of and access to DNA samples. It alsothis is another crucial pointproduces annual reports, statements and bulletins in relation to the DNA database. That is a fairly tight remit, and there will be interpretation of it. The crucial points are that the board will publish an annual report, it will have oversight on statements and policy, and there will be ministerial accountability. Gary Pugh, who gave evidence to the Committee, is the boards current chair.

Douglas Hogg: I heard the phrase ministerial accountability, and I welcome it, but accountability to Parliament can operate only if Parliament is kept informed. Therefore, I would like to know, in the context of ministerial accountability, what Parliament will be told and in what circumstances reports will be submitted.

David Hanson: That goes to the nub of the amendmentsthere is an amendment that would require a report to Parliament. There is currently an annual report, and that is the procedure that we wish to continue.

Douglas Hogg: Is it to Parliament?

David Hanson: The report is available in the Library, but it is not a report to Parliament in the strictest sense of the wording, or a formal paper laid before the House. However, an annual report is available for scrutiny, and I would be interested to know whether members of the Committee looked at it before this debate.
Amendment 29 would require the board to report on the effectiveness of the database and to make recommendations on the use of DNA profiles. That is already part of the boards responsibilities, as I have outlined, so the amendment is unnecessary.
Amendments 30 and 32 would require that the boards governance rules and reporting requirements are laid before Parliament rather than published by the Secretary of State. I am content to look at the issue on the basis of the debate we just held. It is a reasonable assumption that we would have an annual report, and I am not averse to looking at a report to Parliament. Ultimately, we can reflect on the matter if need be, but, at present, the important point is that we have an annual report that is available to whoever happens to be interested in scrutinising it.
Amendment 31 would require details of the boards membership to be included in the process. That information is already available for public scrutiny, and it is important to continue to provide it. There is widespread public interest, and there is certainly a need to ensure that the people who are on the board and undertaking that governance role are identifiable and open to scrutiny.
I have no problem in reflecting further on the amendment. How about that? Parliamentary process in action.

Simon Burns: Unusually.

David Hanson: I had the privilege of serving in this House in opposition for five years, and, on the 11 or 12 Bill Committees that I served on, not once did I ever have one of my proposed amendments accepted.
I am happy to look at how we improve scrutiny. I want the public to have confidence in the board and in the scrutiny of the DNA database. We currently publish an annual report, and we could do one for Parliament. I do not want to accept the amendment now because, as ever, we need to reflect on it, but I am not averse to the ideait does not seem to be an area of great difficulty. If the hon. Member for Hornchurch will withdraw the amendment, I will reflect on it and possibly introduce an amendment in due course.
Finally, amendment 33 would require the strategy board to monitor
the sharing of information held on the...database with other agencies and organisations.
Access to such data is already set out in legislation and strictly monitored by the national DNA database delivery unit, so there are already strict controls over the circumstances. I do not think that it would be appropriate to accept the amendment, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the PrĂ1/4m convention, and the Committee had a discussion earlier about its impact. As hon. Members will know from that discussion, the Government, through the Justice and Home Affairs Council, agreed in June 2008 to adopt the PrĂ1/4m convention decision, which was initially made on 27 May 2005 by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain to help cross-border co-operation on serious crime issues, including terrorism and illegal migration. The PrĂ1/4m convention will come into force in the UK in respect of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration by August 2011.
To date there has been no exchange of information under the convention, although information is exchanged routinely, as I mentioned earlier, with serious crime agencies when requests are made, including for biometric evidence. That applies when the crime is sufficiently serious that a European arrest warrant could be issued under the PrĂ1/4m conventionmy hon. Friend the Under-Secretary deals with such matters regularlyand when there is a request for such information under the terms that I mentioned earlier.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington mentioned the Select Committee evidence of the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham following a tragic murder in his family, when DNA evidence was collected from members of his family. The hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham voluntarily provided his DNA, and because it was a voluntary sample it was not finally loaded on the DNA database. His DNA profile was not and never has been loaded on to that database. Because of the voluntary nature of that sample, that potential involvement has been proved not to be a concern.

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister for what he said, but that is not my point. The evidence given by the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham was about some of his elderly relatives, to whom officers were dispatched many miles to take DNA samples, although as he stated in his evidence it was clear to him at least that they were unlikely to have been involved in the murder of his close relative, although the police may have needed to investigate the matter further.

David Hanson: I respect the judgment of the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham, but he is not a serving police officer investigating a serious offence. If an officer deems that such a thing might help to rule people in or out of an investigation, that is a reasonable judgment, given that the DNA was given voluntarily and has not been loaded on to the database.

Robert Flello: I was going to make the point that my hon. Friend the Minister just made. DNA samples are often needed to rule people out. If a large amount of DNA was collected, it would be important to discount some of that information to get down to the important parts of the investigation.

David Hanson: Indeed, to put aside for a moment the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham, on numerous occasions the police say to a community, Please will individuals give a voluntary DNA sample? Individuals do come forward if the police say, for example, that the suspect in a geographical area was a male between 20 and 25. Their DNA is not loaded on to a database afterwardsthey are ruled out once investigations are completebut it is a valuable tool and helps the police focus on a smaller group who could be involved in a case.

Douglas Hogg: I reinforce what the Minister said. Within my professional knowledge, that happens. When scenes of crimes officers are working on a site, they need to be able to exclude as well as to identify. That extends not just to DNA, but to fingerprints and often other material, too. It is about ruling out as well as including.

David Hanson: On a voluntary basis, that is a useful community contribution to crime fighting, which helps ultimately and has helpedI cannot mention particular cases now, but I am aware of thembring people to court who were subsequently convicted and are now serving sentences. Not only are those crimes solved, but we should never forget that individuals who exhibit dangerous behaviour have been prevented from committing future crimes.

Tom Brake: I want to make it clearI need it to go on the recordthat Ministers and other right hon. and hon. Members are seeking to portray me as someone who is in principle opposed to the use of DNA, which clearly I am not. There are numerous circumstances in which that is appropriate. I am pleased that in the case of Sally Anne Bowman, which the Minister has quoted, involving the daughter of a constituent of mine, many thousands of men came forward voluntarily to give their DNA so as to be excluded from the police inquiries. I fully support that.

David Hanson: I have never said anything to the contrary. If you recall, Mr. Cook, I praised the hon. Gentlemans position as being principled, consistent and absolutely sound in its logic.

Douglas Hogg: But?

David Hanson: I just happen to disagree completely with the hon. Gentlemans position. There is nothing wrong with the logic of saying that nobody who is not convicted should be on the DNA database. It is a perfectly logical position to hold; I just do not think that it is the correct position and I have tried to expose that in our debate today.
I hope that the hon. Member for Hornchurch will consider withdrawing the amendment on the basis that I have given him an assurance that we will look at the matter. If practical, we will seek to ensure greater scrutiny of the board and improve reporting mechanisms.

James Brokenshire: I am gratified by the Minister of States responseduring a debate where there has been, shall we say, some differences of approachand to hear that he is prepared to consider and examine a number of the amendments to ensure robust oversight. I should have recorded formally an acknowledgement of the work undertaken by the existing board and the reports it has provided. The reports have been informative, helpful and benefited the debate.
If we seek to place the national DNA database strategy board on a more formal footing, it is worth reflecting on being more specific about making provisions for reporting to Parliament. I am gratified that the Minister of State has acknowledged that he is prepared, because of the sensitive nature of the issues, to ensure that there is appropriate oversight and that we have that level of scrutiny and accountability. Parliament will be then aided in holding Ministers to account. That sense of responsibility was alluded to in a number of the comments in the debate. I am gratified by the positive response from the Minister of State on the suggested amendments. I look forward to his reflection on them and hope that the Government make changes as a consequence.
I also note the Minister of States comments on the moves towards the adoption of the PrĂ1/4m treaty: the examination of data sharing, and perhaps the interrelationship between the oversight board and the work of the DNA database strategy unit. While the strategy unit monitors that, the effectiveness and appropriate use of the national DNA database needs to examined and reflected on closely. I do not think that the Minister gave any updated indication on the likely cost of implementing the PrĂ1/4m treaty, in contrast with the indication given by the previous Under-Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, North (Joan Ryan). It would be helpful to receive that at some point.
The Ministers comments have been helpful, and in the light of his offer calmly to reflect on the changes we have suggested and, I hope, come forward with some proposals, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Power to issue a domestic violence protection notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.
New clause 28Definition of domestic violence
(1) Domestic violence is defined as an incident of
(a) threatening behaviour,
(b) violence, or
(c) abuse, whether physical, sexual, financial or emotional,
committed by a person (P) on an adult who is or has been an intimate partner or family member of P, regardless of the gender or sexuality of either person, and which is one of a series of such incidents.
(2) Abuse under subsection (1)(c) may include
(a) destruction of a spouses or partners property;
(b) isolation of a spouse or partner from friends, family or other potential sources of support;
(c) threats to others, including children;
(d) control over access to money, personal items, food, transport, and telephone services; and
(e) the effect of any of paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) on children..

Robert Flello: I want to record my thanks to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children for its support and assistance.
One of my great concerns about domestic violence is the impact on children. On Thursday 28 January, we heard evidence about that. For example, Deborah McIlveen said:
The violence impacts on the children. That does not necessarily mean that a child who has experienced or witnessed it will become either a perpetrator or a victim. However, it does affect their behaviour in all sorts of ways, particularly with regard to their education.
During the same evidence session, Jane Keeper noted that those children, if they eventually get to organisations such as the one she representsRefuge, the national domestic violence charitysay,
Why did no one do anything? The police were called. Why did nobody help us? [Official Report, Crime and Security Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2010; c.87, Q183.]
Children learn from those experiences that such things do not matter and are not important. But they do matter and they are incredibly important. The impact on children of domestic violence is quite terrifying not only for the child concerned, but for society.
Such violence may affect children in many ways. The problem is not just what they hear. Children upstairs may hear the sounds of violent behaviour downstairs when they are supposed to be sleeping and being refreshed for school next day. They may frequently see their mother being injured and suffering horrendous injuries. There may be damage to the home: doors and furniture may be broken, and their toys may be destroyed as part of inflicting domestic violence on the spouse or partner. There could be reckless behaviourthe perpetrator may drive recklessly with the family in the car to terrify the victim and their children. All those examples of how children suffer the impact of domestic violence are, sadly, far too frequent, and because of its nature, they may see it so often that it becomes almost normalised behaviour. That is why it may be such a tragedy for them in the longer term.
The purpose of new clause 28 is to put in the Bill a clear statement that domestic violence may include threats against children, and that violence against the victim has effects on children. I hope that the Minister will consider the proposal carefully, because it is crucial to send a message to those children that they are not forgotten victims of the horrific crime that happens in their home, but that they are seen as victims. I hope the Minister will address the matter.
I am conscious that we are perhaps 20 minutes from the end of this afternoons sitting. I do not want to detain the Committee too long, but I want to stress how crucial the issue is. We have the opportunity to send a clear message to children who are growing up with domestic violence around them, and to subsequent generations who may be affected, that the House takes the matter extremely seriously and is prepared to take action.

James Brokenshire: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South, who spoke about the new clause so effectively. The NSPCC highlighted the matter, and I will come to its comments later.
Witnessing domestic violence may have a serious impact on a young person growing up in such an environment and, sadly, that impact may be lifelong in certain circumstancesin due course, we will debate the impact of gang-related violence. There is some analysis showing that the predilection of a young person to behave violently may have been in some way conditioned, influenced or affected by the home environment in which they grew up. If they are exposed to or see abuse and violence, they may think that is an appropriate or acceptable way to behave. It creates conflict: they see someone who is violent but at the same time they may still love them. They do not understand what happens when they hit someone in the school environment. Domestic violence creates confusion, isolation and possible recruitment down a rather dark path of crime. There is lack of opportunity and lack of social justice for many young children growing up in such environments.
The issue is important and speaks to a number of factors relating to social problems and causes of crime among young children. We must do what we can as a society to ensure that children grow up in a good, strong family environment without fear of violence or abuse, because of the long-lasting implications of exposure to those sorts of family circumstances.
I want to address some broader issues in relation to the domestic violence protection notice regime. There is a significant problem: around 14 per cent. of all violent offences involve domestic violence. That probably significantly understates the problem, because there are reporting issues. The cycle of violence continues and may get worse and worse. The desire to take further action on that serious problem is reflected in the provisions in clause 21 and subsequent clauses.
Questions have been raised about the use of the powers, but before I go on to them I shall deal with the background to go orders. In other European countries they have been used as an inexpensive short-term measure to remove the perpetrator of domestic violence from the home, allowing the victim to remain in it and buying the victim some breathing space to decide what steps should be taken. A recommendation from the Home Affairs Committee encouraged the Government to examine such provisions to buy breathing space for victims to consider their options.
It is worth reflecting on some of the points that have been raised about the use of domestic violence protection orders elsewhere. They have been successfully introduced in several European countries; Austria is often held up as the best example. An evaluation of the use of similar orders in Austria found that they were generally supported by victims and were effective if linked to support and help. That is an important point to make in relation to the provisions in the Bill. They should not be seen in isolation. They need to be part of a wider approach and strategy, as the Home Affairs Committee pointed out in its report. Paragraph 340 states:
Development of GO orders in the UK should be linked with Sanctuary schemes, which we discuss in paragraphs 221 to 227 of this report, to provide further protection to victims who remain in their own home.
That is just one example, but it fits within a broader approach to highlighting the significance of domestic violence.
Those are positive reasons for the provisions. We broadly support the concept of the orders, provided that they are part of wider measures and are not seen in isolation. We heard some quite compelling evidence. I was struck by the comments of Brian Moore:
There are 200,000 arrests per year, but only about 60,000 prosecutionsthere is a gap of about 140,000 cases where there is insufficient evidence available to bring a prosecution. In those circumstances, the perpetrator is released from the police station and goes back to the very address where he was arrested perhaps 24 hours earlier. That is an extremely dangerous time and that is the gap we are trying to close. When the police have done all they can to bring a prosecution after arrest and it is simply not possible to do so, there remains a gap where there is a high level of risk.[Official Report, Crime and Security Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2010; c.75-6, Q161.]
That comment neatly summarises the reasons why these provisions have been brought forward. I will raise with the Minister some other related aspects; for example, overlap with existing measures and their interrelationship in the operation of the provisions. That will come up in relation to other amendments as we proceed with our consideration of these clauses.
Before leaving clause 21 and the related provisions, I note that a domestic violence protection notice is issued by a police officer under stated conditions for authorisation. We will discuss that in further detail under some of the notification requirements in clause 22. The officer must have reasonable grounds that there has been violence towards the individual and that the notice is necessary to protect someone from violence or the threat of it from the person described as P.
We need to ensure that the power is used properly and appropriately. Concerns have been raised about what judgments might be formulated. There is a need for appropriate training in the use of the power, to ensure against false allegations being made. An officer on the ground who has received an allegation has to consider what may be appropriate when considering whether to issue a domestic violence protection notice.
It would be helpful to hear from the Minister of State the Governments intentions on rolling out the procedure. Although the authorisation comes from an officer at superintendent level, which is quite high in this context, the likelihood is that the facts will be presented to a constable who will have to make recommendations to the superintendent. What measures, mechanisms and discussions have taken place, either with the Superintendents Association or ACPO, regarding implementation of the power, to ensure that it is used as intended? As I understand itwe will come to this laterthe intention is that the power should initially be used only on a pilot basis. That is right and we will be able to debate it further.
This new concept and the provisions in clause 21 need to be tested in a local area before their wider application across the country is considered. The impact on the person subject to an order could be quite draconian. Subsection (8) says that if the relevant person P lives in the same premises as the person protected by the notice, P is prohibited from entering the premises. That has significant implications for that individual. Careful consideration will need to be given to the utilisation of such powers.
Given the obvious questions about homelessness and any housing requirements that local authorities may need to fulfil in that context, local authorities and crime and disorder reduction partnerships may need to be bound more cohesively into the arrangements to ensure that the powers are being used appropriately. However, we will drill down into the detail in subsequent clauses.
Another point was powerfully made in evidence when Steve Connor said:
Approximately 18 per cent. of the 6,000 calls per month that we deal with are from male victims of domestic violence. That is a huge problem. Research shows that it is usually much harder for a man to contact the police or a support agency, because as well as having the usual violence, intimidation and emotional fear factors, you have the additional hurdle of feeling embarrassed that you are a man and you are being abused.[Official Report, Crime and Security Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2010; c. 91, Q186.]
It would be helpful to hear from the Minister how the Government see the power being used in such circumstances. What training or guidance is being considered for police officers to take account of the sort of issues highlighted in Committee, especially given the number of complaints received by the National Centre for Domestic Violence, the organisation represented by Steve Connor? Such issues are not discussed enough, and it was useful that Steve Connor highlighted the fact.
I return to new clause 28. As I say, domestic violence has obviously been highlighted by the NSPCC, which stressed the definition of domestic violence used by the Home Office:
 Any incident of threatened behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.
The NSPCC noted the differences in what happens under the Home Office, and in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but it recognised the overlap between abuse of the non-abusive parent and abuse of children.
The Government are committed to reviewing the definition in 2010, and that is partly dealt with in the Bill. We heard from the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South that the NSPCC is calling on the Government to include in their definition children and the impact of abuse. A significant point is being made, for reasons to which I alluded at the start of my speech. It needs to be considered carefully to ensure that the problem of abuse in the family home and the implications for children are properly reflected upon. I look forward with interest to the Ministers response to the new clause, and more generally to the points that I highlighted in the context of clause 21, so that we may better consider whether it should stand part of the Bill.

Tom Brake: I shall pick up where the hon. Member for Hornchurch finished. I congratulate the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South on his new clause. He set out with some clarity how the definition should be expanded. He said that domestic violence affects children and that any definition should take that fact on board. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has had discussions with the Minister about whether his new clause will be accepted. The Minister may indicate that he is supportive of the proposalsalthough he may not take Back-Bench or Opposition amendments on board twice in one sitting. I shall wait with interest to hear the Ministers response to new clause 28.
I hope that the Minister will respond to a couple of other points. At our third sitting, Brian Moore said that if Parliament thought it appropriate for DVPNs to be issued to under-18sa slightly different aspect of childrenACPO would not stand in the way. Did the Minister of State receive representations from ACPO that DVPNs might be applicable or available to use with children? That is not something I advocate, bearing in mind what I shall say about gang injunctions. I would be interested to know, however, whether any debate or discussion took place and what the outcome was.
Another point raised during our third evidence sitting was whether any estimate had been made of how many DVPNs might be issued and, therefore, what sort of pressure that might place on magistrates courts or other parts of the system. I accept that it is difficult for the Minister of State to answer that question, but some analysis of the potential number of requests may have already been done. If that is the case, I hope that the Minister will put it on the record so that we have some feel for the number of DVPNs the Government expect to be issued.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.(Mr. Watts.)

Adjourned till Tuesday 9 February at half-past Ten oclock.